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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

G.f\ YLAND, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent, ~
vs.
1

SAL1 LAI<E COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH; LAMONT B. GUNDERSEN, \Case No.
EDWIN Q. CANNON, JR., and
9 2 80
WILLIAM G. LARSON, Individually
and as members of the Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
Defendants and Appellants, ,

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff owned certain lands in Salt Lake County
some distance southeast of Salt Lake City limits. Action was
brought by the plaintiff against Salt Lake County and the
County Commissioners for a Declaratory Judgment declaring
the zoning resolutions of Salt Lake County unlawful and illegal
because of the failure of the Commission to follow the statu-
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tory procedure in adopting the same. The complaint also asked
in the alternative that the court order a reclassification of a
portion of the plaintiff's lands from Residential R-2 to Commercial C- 2 classification on the grounds that the classification
as Residential R-2 was unreasonable, arbitrary and an abuse of
the discretion of the county commissioners. The evidence was
stipulated to by the parties and judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiff ordering the reclassification on the grounds
that the R-2 classification was arbitrary and unreasonable.
The court found that the County Commission had failed
to observe the terms of the statutes in adopting the zoning
resolutions, but refused to declare the resolutions invalid. The
defendants appealed from the decision of the court ordering
the reclassification. The plaintiff cross-appealed from the refusal of the court to declare the zoning resolutions invalid.

STATEMENT OF FACT
The plaintiff is the owner of a sizable tract of land in
Salt Lake County located near the intersection of 5600 South
and 13th East. This land was classified by Salt Lake County
in its zoning regulations as Residential R-2, which prohibited
the building thereon of a commercial shopping center.
The plaintiff made application to the Salt Lake County
Planning Commission for the reclassification of approximately
18 acres of the property owned by the plaintiff from Residential
R-2 to Commercial C-2. The County Planning Commission,
after securing the consent of the plaintiff, ieduced the amount
of land to be reclassified from 18 acres to 10 acres, and unanin1ousl y recommended to the County Commission that said 10
acres be so reclassified.
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The matter was set down for public hearing. At the hearing a petition favoring the cha~ge in zoning, signed by in
excess of 1000 residents of the area, was submitted in evidence.
~\ number of residents of the immediate area appeared and
gave testimony in support of the proposed change. No witnesses
residing or owning land in the immediate vicinity opposed the
change. HoVv'ever, there were several witnesses owning competing cotnmercial property located from 1h mile to 31h miles
from the property in question that appeared in opposition. No
representatives of the county or of the state appeared to give
any testimony regarding highway congestion, sanitation or any
other tnatters \vhich might be taken into consideration in such
a situation. After the hearing the County Commission voted
2 - 1 to deny the reclassification. Commissioner Cannon, one
of the commissioners voting against the reclassification, clear] y
stated in the Commission meeting at the time of casting his vote
that he was so voting because of the effect the rezoning would
have on competing commercial properties.
Salt Lake County has never adopted a master plan for
zoning, nor has it ever set up or established any standards to
determine the classification of any particular area. Zoning in
the county has proceeded and in this case did proceed merely
upon the whims of the individual commissioners as to whether
a certain area should be zoned commercial or residential.
As a basis for seeking a reversal of the decision of the
District Court, the appellants rely on three points. We will
hereafter in our brief discuss these points in the order in which
they are raised by the appellants.
In addition to meeting the argument of the appellants, it
is the position of the respondent that the zoning resolutions of
Salt Lake County should be declared invalid as prayed for in
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the complaint and in seeking such relief the respondent relies
upon the following

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING TH.A.T THE
FAILURE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO ADOPT A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE ZONING RESOLUTIONS OF SALT
LAI<E COUNTY.

ARGUMENT
In this brief we will answer under the headings Points
1, 2 and 3 the respective points raised by the appellant. Under
Point 4 we will argue the point raised by the respondent on
cross-appeal.

POINTS ONE AND TWO
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW ZONING ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS WHERE THE BOARD ACTS
UNREASONABLY AND ARBITRARILY AND IN ABUSE
OF SOUND DISCRETION.
Points 1 and 2 as set forth by counsel for the appellant
in their brief are closely related and can best be considered in
conjunction with each other. In making their argument counsel
have selected out of context language from a number of Utah
cases and have come up with a conclusion that these cases do
not support, in fact a conclusion that these cases directly refute.
In effect, counsel argue:
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(a) Zoning is a legislative function;
(b)
process.

The courts may not interfere with the legislative

Therefore, the courts may not revtew any action of the
county commissioners pertaining to zoning.
It is true that the case of Walton v. Tracy Collins Trust,
97 Ut. 249, 92 Pac.2d 724 has a paragraph contained therein
to the effect that zoning power is a legislative function. It is
also true that the old case of City of 0 gden v. Crossman, 17 Ut.
66, 53 Pac. 985 has language which implies that under no circumstances rna y the court interfere with the legislative process
so long as the legislative process is actually confined to its
proper sphere. However, in numerous cases, the court has
expressly held that the zoning function may be reviewed by
the courts not only when the zoning body exceeds its jurisdiction, but also where it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably or otherwise abuses sound discretion.
In the Walton case there was not involved the power of
the court to review the zoning regulations of a city. In that
case was involved the question of the power of a subsidiary
administrative body to exercise the zoning power. A number
of subsequent cases however, some of which are in fact quoted
by the appellant, definitely establish that the courts do have
the Jurisdiction to review the zoning function. The language
in the case of Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Ut. 111, 141 Pac.
2d 704 clearly states the extent of the power of the court to
revie\v the zoning function. There the court said-:

"Unless the action of such body (the city commission) is arbitrary, discri~t.NAT,y_!fOf unreasonable or
clearly offends some provision of the constitution or
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statute, the court must uphold it, if within the grant of
power to the municipality."
From this language, .it- is obvious that the court may assume
jurisdiction to review the action of the city commission in zoning
matters in cases where (a) they act beyond their power as
granted by the statutes of the state; or (b) although acting
within 'the scope of such power, they act arbitrarily or unreasonably, or where they offend against some provision of the constitution or statute.
In the case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City.
et al., 116 Ut. 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, the court stated:
((Sections 15-8-89, 90, 91, and 92, U.C.A. 1943, grant
the governing body of the city the discretionary power
to district and zone cities for various purposes that are
to the public interest; and the exercise of that power
will not be interfered with by the courts unless tbe
discretion is abused:''
In the case of Dou'se v. Salt Lake City, 123 Ut. 107, 225
Pac. 2d 723, the court stated:
<(The wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number,
nature and boundaries of the district are matters which
lie within the discretion of the city authorities, and only
if their action is confiscato1'y, discriminatory or arbitrary
1nay the court set aside their action.··
The power of the court to review actions of the zoning
body to determine w-hether or not they are arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory is likewise upheld in th case of S1nith l'. Barrett, 20 Pac. 2d864. See also Provo City tJ. Claudin, 91 U. 60,
63 P. 2d 570.
There can be, therefor~~, no question as to the jurisdiction
of the court to hear the case or to issue the order in question.
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The only matter for determination is whether or not the evidence establishes that the action of the county commission was
arbitrary or unreasonable or otherwise not in pursuance of the
zoning po,vers conferred upon them generally under the police
powers of the state. These are matters which we will discuss
in the next succeeding section.
We have no quarrel with the statement of counsel nor
\vith the cases which they cite to the effect that we n1ay not
inquire into the motives of the county commission. In this
regard they seem to have erected a straw man in order to blow
it down. No where in the findings is the question of motive
mentioned. It matters not what impelled members of the county
commission to vote in a certain way if there is a good sound
basis for their so voting. If there is a good sound basis to support the vote, the action of the commission may be sustained
even though the thing which compelled the commissioners to
vote as they did was wholly frivolous and not germane to the
question. On the other hand, though they may have voted with
the noblest of motives if there is no sound fundamental reason
to support the position which they take, their action cannot be
upheld. Therefore, the question into which we must look here
is not, what were their motives, but was there good sound basic
reason for what they did under the police power of the state.
This \vill be discussed in the next succeeding section.

POINT III
THE COUNTY COMMISSION'S ACTION IN REFUSING THE REZONING OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY Al'JD AN
ABUSE OF SOUND DISCRETION.
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The plaintiff made application to the County Planning
Commission to rezone 80 acres in the vicinity of 56th South
and 1250 East to permit the creation of an area shopping center.
This application was turned down by the Planning Commission.
After working further with the Planning Commission, the
plaintiff submitted his revised application to rezone 18.78 acres.
The Planning Commission held hearings on this proposal and
after a full investigation recommended the rezoning on the 23rd
day of May, 1959, and cited as the reason for their action the
following:
Hit was felt that this commercial center is needed
because of the existing and anticipated growth in this
area and the lack of commercial facilities to serve the
expansion.''
Because of certain problems with approach roads, the matter
was further investigated by the Planning Commission, and the
plaintiff reduced the amount of land sought to be rezoned to
10 acres. Again the Planning Commission took favorable action.
On August 25, 1959, it unanimously approved the application
of the plaintiff, and it stated under the caption ((Reasons for
Action'' (Exhibit 1) :
ccIt was found that a neighborhood shopping center
was necessary to serve the growing population in this
part of the County."
The County Commission called a public hearing on the matter
for November 4, 1959. At this hearing a petition \Vas filed,
signed by over 1,000 residents in the area immediately surrounding the area proposed to be rezoned. The petition
contained the signature of substantially every resident of
property adjoining the 10 acre piece, or so near thereto as to
be affected by the operation of a shopping center thereon.
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There also appeared at the hearing and gave statements some
14 witnesses from the immediate vicinity. No witness residing
near the land in question appeared in protest. No \vitness of
the County or other civic groups appeared for the purpose
of giving testin1ony as to congestion of streets, sewage disposal
or other problems. There were 14 witnesses appearing in
opposition. Each one of the 14 witnesses appearing in opposition either ov.rned, or was an attorney for the owner of,
land in southeast Salt Lake County which is zoned con1merciall y. Some of these commercially zoned lands already
had commercial buildings thereon, while others were merely
bare land being held by the owners for speculation. A reading
of the testimony of these 14 witnesses shows that the sole
reason given by them in opposition to the proposed change
was that it would have a detrimental effect on their own
property. After the hearing the Commission sat on the matter
for some five n1onths without action. On March 14, 1960,
they denied the zoning change. Commissioner Gundersen
voted for the change and Commissioners Cannon and Larson
voted against it. In casting his vote against the change, Commissioner Cannon frankly stated that he was voting against
it because of its impact on other commercial zones in the
area ( R. 18) . In setting down their reasons for this action, the
Commissioners stated: ~~There is sufficient commercial zontng
tn the area; not warranted at this time." (Ex. 1).
The power of the County to zone or rezone property is
based upon the police power, and in the absence of a valid
exercise of that power a zoning restriction cannot stand. The
follow·ing language is found at 101 Corpus Juris Secundunz
705:
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((In general, zoning, or lawful zoning, is within and
constitutes a lawful and valid exercise of the police
power, and its validity may be sustained thereunder.
Subject to constitutional and statutory guaranties, limitations, and restrictions, as discussed infra Sec. 17, and
to the requirement that they must be reasonable, infra
Sec. 68, the validity of zoning enactments, regulations,
and restrictions is dependent on their being within and
constituting a valid exercise of the police power, or on
their having a reasonable relation thereto, and, hence,
they must fall as invalid unless they are within and can
be supported as a legitimate exercise thereof."
In order to be a valid exercise of the police power, action
taken by public authority thereunder must be reasonably
related to the public health, safety, welfare or morals. Zoning
authorities do not sit as boards of business regulation for
the purpose of determining whether or not competition shall
be allowed in lawful commercial pursuits. While zoning
authorities often attempt to occupy this position, where it
appears that there is no valid basis for their action, except
the matter of limiting commercial competition, the courts
are unanimous in holding that such is not a valid exercise
of the zoning powers. If an economic advantage is conveyed
upon the owner of land by coincident in the course of the
exercising of the police power for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals or welfare, such a conferring of economic advantage does not invalidate the zoning regulation.
However, when there is no other valid supporting reason for
the regulation except the question of limiting commercial
competition, it must fail. The follo\\·ing language is found
in the case of In re Lieb' s Appeal, 116 Atl. ( 2) 860, at page

865:
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"Under some circumstances zoning does limit competition by restricting the area within \vhich it can be
established or conducted. This is a by-product of zoning. An ordinance which results in the restriction of
competition is not unlawful because of it, but the purpose of zoning is not to limit or restrict competition.
It \vould be unlawful for a council to zone or rezone
or refuse to zone or rezone for this purpose. Unlike
public utility laws, zoning is not for the purpose of
limiting or prohibiting competition and when that is
the only purpose of a zoning ordinance, it must be
declared invalid. The appellant is not entitled to protection against competition by means of a zoning
ordinance."
Another case passing upon the same point is the case of
Benson t'. Zoning Board of Appeals (Conn.), 27 Atl. (2)
389, at page 391, where the court stated:
"The record shows that the court's decision was predicated upon the premise that the defendants' denial
of the application was based on the objection of the
competitors which were not (a proper factor to be considered under the zoning act.' The court was correct in
holding that the zoning authority had no right to regard
the preventing of competition as a factor in administering the zoning law."
We know that in the practice of law that it is unusual to
find a case reported where all of the fact situations are the
same as in the case under consideration. However, in this
instance, we do have such a case recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. 1'his case
is Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Davis, reported
at 106 S.E. (2) 152. In that case the owners of certain property
which was zoned for_, residential purposes and was being sub-
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divided, applied for a zoning change to permit the use of
tv1enty-one acres of the property as a shopping center. Some
1200 residents of the area signed a petition in favor of the
rezoning. The main opposition came from the developers of
another shopping center one and a quarter miles away from
the property in question. The planning commission, by a vote
of 9-2, favored granting the application. After a hearing,
the board of county supervisors, by a vote of 6-1, denied the
rezoning. The matter was taken to courts and the lower court
held that the board had improperly denied the application for
rezoning because the principal ground for denial was the
effect upon a competing shopping center. This decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower
court. The Court of Appeals stated:
((It is not a proper function of a zoning ordinance to
restrict competition or to protect an enterprise which
may have been encouraged by a prior zoning classification. * * * As Frederick H. Burr, Jr., a planning and
economic development consultant, who testified on
behalf of the Reed Estate said:
(( 'The only point at which it is proper in zoning, in
my opinion, to consider the economic effects is the
point at which the economic effects reach into the general welfare. So far as holding one piece of ground for
a shopping center and prohibiting other shopping centers which are needed simply because a prior commitment has been made or a prior piece of land has been
zoned is not-it does not properly come under zoning
as a function.' * * * We agree with the holding of the
lower Court that the evidence shows that the denial
by the board of rezoning application was based upon
improper factors 'vhich bore no reasonable relation to
the public health, safety, morals or welfare of the
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community and was therefor arbitrary, unreasonable
and invalid."
For other cases of the same general holding, see Duncan
/lz.·e. Corporation v. Jersey City, 122 N.J. 292; 5 Atl. (2) 68;
G,t/;rielson L'. Borough of Glen Ridge, (N.J.) 176 Atl. 676,
Robinson z·. Tou·n Council of Narragansett, (R.I.) 199 Atl. 308.
This case falls exactly within the decided cases. Application was first made for this change in classification to the
County Planning Commission. Provision for the appointment
of this Commission is made by Sec. 17-27-2, U.C.A. 1953.
The next succeeding section of the statute gives this board
the authority to hire technical advisors and experts and to
employ a staff for the purposeof carrying out their functions
of making zoning recommendations to the County Commission.
17-27-14, U.C.A., 1953 provides that all applications for
arnendment must go first to the County Planning Commission.
The plaintiff complied with this statute exactly. In making
changes in the proposal the recommendations of the County
Planning Commission were concurred in by the plaintiff. When
this matter was sent down to the County Commission, this advisory body of the County Commission, which had gone into all
aspects of the case as far as public health, safety, welfare and
morals \vere concerned, advised the County Commission that
there \vas no good reason to prohibit commercial development
on this property. In fact, they found that it would be of
benefit to the gro,vth of the area. Presumably, therefore, the
only thing before the County Commission when it considered
the matter \Vas the recommendation of its advisory board plus
'vhatever had been brought out at the hearing. As we have
pointed out, there was nothing brought out at the hearing
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which would v:arrant the restriction of this property against
commercial use.
In their brief, the County has attempted to sustain their
action on the basis of a passing statement found on page 60
of the record of the hearing before the Commission. A Mrs.
Rippe, the owner of a competing porperty some three miles
away, had the following to say in regard to the problem of
traffic:
((Imagine how many cars are going to line up in that
small area before they swing out of the area and wait
for the red signal to turn green. I am in the insurance
business and I know that bumpers have actually hit on
the small shopping areas.''
Her principal basis for opposition, however, was stated in more
detail, and she concluded as follows:
''I also feel that the type of developer that our opponent is that if he is beginning with ten acres, he is a
very progressive man; he will be requesting more later.
It will have a tendency to hurt all shopping centers.''
Commissioner Cannon, when casting his vote, and the
other Commissioners when putting down the basis for their
action, were frank to state that their action was not based upon
the things properly withinthe police power, but was based
solely upon the question of whether or not they felt additional
zoning for commercial purposes would have an adverse effect
upon the lands already zoned commercially. This was the
finding of the trial court, a finding which is supported-in
fact compelled-by the evidence. Under the uniform holding
of the courts construction of commercial buildings on the ten
acres in question may not be prohibited on this basis. The
action of the court below should be upheld in this regard.
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POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PAILURE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO ADOPT A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY.
Counties are political bodies of limited authority. They
are created by the state and have no powers except those that
the state grants them either by specific provision or by necessary
implication. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sec. 4, 17-4-1,
U.C.A. 1953. The powers of a county are entirely dependent
upon the statutory grant of power and county governments
are more restricted in their powers than are the governments
of incorporated cities. Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 U. 546
at page 562, 200 P. 510 at page 516. Chapter 27 of Title 17
U.C.A., 1953 grants to County Commissioners the power to
zone, however, the power in not a limitless grant. This chapter
makes provision for the method and the steps to be taken
by the County Commission in adopting zoning regulations.
Sec. 17-27-1 provides:
C!The boards of county commissioners of the respective counties within the state are authorized and empowered to provide for the physical development of
the unincorporated territory within the county and for
the zoning of all or any part of such unincorporated
territory in the 1nanner hereinafter provided.'' (Elnphasis added.)
Sec. 17-27-4 to Sec. 17-27-11 inclusive make provision for
the procedure to be followed by the County Commission in
adopting zoning resolutions and in particular sets up the
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requirement that prior to adopting a valid zoning ordinance,
the Con1mission must adopt a comprehensive master plan for
the development of the unincorporated areas of the county.
Sec. 17-27-5 states the general purposes in making a
master plan as follows:
('In the preparation of a county master plan, a county
planning com1nission shall make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing conditions
and probable future growth of the territory within its
jurisdiction. The county master plan shall be made \vith
the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a
coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of
the county which will, in accordance with the present
and future needs and resources, best promote the health,
safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, or the
general welfare of the inhabitants, as well as efficiency
and economy in the process of development, including
amongst other things, the distribution of population
and of the uses of land for urbanization, trade, industry, habitation, recreation, agriculture, arboretum and
other purposes, as will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, transportation, prosperity, civic
activities, and recreational, educational and cultural
opportunities; will tend to reduce the wastes of physical, financial, or human resources which result from
either excessive congestion or excessive scattering of
population; and will tend toward an efficient and economical utilization, conservation and production of the
supply of food and water, and of drainage, sanitary,
and other facilities and resources."
Sec. 17-27-9 to 17-27-11 deal exclusively with the land
utilization or zoning portion of the master plan. Sec. 17-27-9
provides as follows:
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uThe county planning commission of any county may,
and upon order of the board of county commissioners
in any county having a county planning commission,
shall make a zoning plan or plans for zoning all or any
part of the unincorporated territory within such county,
including both the full text of the zoning resolution
or resolutions and the maps, and representing the recommendations of the commission for the regulation by
districts or zones of the location, heights, bulk, and
size of buildings and other structures, percentage of lot
which may be occupied, the size of lots, courts, and
other open spaces, the density and distribution of population, the location and use of buildings and structures
for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade,
industry, recreation or other purposes."
Sec. 17-27-10 provides for the presentation of the zoning
plan to the county commissioners and the holding of public
hearings thereon. The pertinent part thereof is as follows:
((After receiving the certification of said zoning plan
or plans from the commission and be fore the adoption
of any zoning resolution or resolutions, the board of
county commissioners shall hold a public hearing
thereon * * * * ." (Emphasis added).
From the foregoing, it is evident that before the County
Commission may adopt any valid zoning resolution or resolutions it is required by the state legislature to hold a hearing
on and adopt a comprehensive zoning plan, which it was
conceded by the defendants, and which the court held, has not
been done. This provision appears again in Sec. 17-27-11,
\\·hich is the section of the Utah statutes which actually grants
to the counties the power to adopt zoning resolutions. This
section provides as follows:
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rr From

and ajte1· the time when the county planning
corrunission of any county, in accordance with the procedure hereinabove specified~ makes, adopts and certifies to the board of county commissioners a plan or
plans for zoning the unincorporated territory within
any county, or any part thereof, including both the full
text of a zoning resolution and the maps, and after
public hearing thereon, then the board of commissioners, may by resolution regulate in any potrion or portions of such county which lie outside of cities and
towns, the location, height, bulk and size of buildings
and other structures, the percentage of lot which may
be occupied, th e size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the uses of buildings and structures for trade,
industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other
purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry,
residence, recreation or other purposes. * * * * ."
(Emphasis added) .
It is conceded in the pleadings and was admitted by counsel
in the court below that Salt Lake County has not complied with
the law in regard to the establishing a master plan and holding hearings thereon. This it has not done in spite of the fact
that the statute has been on the books in its present form since
1943, and in spite of the fact that the adoption of such a
master plan is by the statute made a definite prerequisite to
the po\\'er of the county commission to adopt zoning regulations and resolutions.
The requirement for such a master plan is common in
the statutes of various states. The reason for such a requirement is obvious. Unless there is such a master plan, zoning
becomes, as it has become in Salt Lake County a hit-and-miss
proposition. The County Comn1ission can as it attempted to do
in this case, sit as a body regulating economic competition.
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•

The county comnltsstoners can grant or withhold economic
favors on the basis of their personal likes or dislikes, or on
the basis of any other reason without relation to the question
of public health, safety, welfare or morals. Wherever such
a requirement for a master plan exists and where it has not
been met, the courts have, with uniformity, held that the
zoning po,ver may not be exercised.
The following language in this regard is found at 101

C.J.S. 735:
(<In order to achieve specified statutory purposes,
it is usually required that zoning regulations be in
accordance with some well-considered and comprehensive plan; and such regulations must adopt a definite
policy * * * "
The follo,ving statement is made by the authors of American Jurisprudence at 58 Am. Jur. 957:
(<Statutes or charters authoriz!~g the enactment of
zoning ordinances frequently contain the provision that
any such ordinance shall be in accord with a well-considered and comprehensive plan, and a zoning ordinance
may be declared invalid where it does not comply with
such provision.''
The state of New York has a requirement similar to ours
relating to the adoption of a ~ewell-considered plan." Such a
plan had not been adopted by the City of Utica, and in striking
do\vn a zoning ordinance of that city, the court in Utica v.
Hanna,. 195 N.Y.S. 225, stated:
Beautification of our cities deserves encouragement,
but measures looking toward beautification must be
the result of careful study of the interests of all persons
affected, so that the total operation of such measures
co
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will surely result in gain to the city as a •whole. It 'Nas
doubtless this thought which led the legislature to
require the zoning ordinances to follow a well-considered plan."
In the case of Chapman v. Troy, 4 So. 2d 1, a similar
result was reached. 1'he Alabama law required in regard to
zoning regulations that usuch regulation shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan." There the court
stated:
UA single ordinance laying off a small portion of
the city as a residence district, taking no account of
other areas equally residential in character, and so far
as appears without any comprehensive plan with a view
to the general wei fare of the inhabitants of the city
as a whole, is not permissible. Piecemeal ordinances
are not favored."
See also in this regard Tex~.trkana v. Marby, 95 SW.2d 871.
In the case of Darlington v. Frankfo1't, 140 SW 2d 392, the
Kentucky court held that where the legislative authorization
for zoning express! y required the zoning ordinance to be
adopted only after the appointment of a zoning commission,
having in mind a survey by it of the entire city, the city cannot
justify the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting the erection
of comtnercial buildings on a street in the absence of a meeting
of the prerequisites for the~r.ising of the zoning authority.
The finding of the Trial Court in this case is proper.
In fact it is necessary under the pleadings and under the
stipulation of counsel. However, its conclusion of law is
erroneous. Obviously this plaintiff is a person injured by the
failure of the County Commission to follo\v the proper procedure in the adopting of the zoning resolutions. Had there
been a master plan and master resolutions set up and a public
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hearing had thereon as required by the statute, this plaintiff
might have appeared there and might have had an opportunity to protest the resolutions before they were ever adopted.
Furthermore, it should be fundamental that if the grant of
the zoning power to the County Commission is made upon
certain conditions and if those conditions have not been met,
it is acting without authority in adopting any zoning resolutions
and its actions are void from the beginning and tn no way
limit or restrict the use of the property.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, plaintiff submits that
the Salt Lake County zoning resolutions should be declared
unlawful and void. In the absence of such a holding the evidence and the law clearly warrant this court in sustaining the
finding of the Trial Court to the effect that the restrictions
placed upon commercial construction on the plaintiff's property
are unreasonable and arbitrary and should not be allowed
to stand.
Respectfully submitted,

CALVIN L. RAMPTON
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
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